This paper presents applicability of Strong Stationary Times (SST) techniques in the area of cryptography. The applicability is in three areas: (1) Propositions of a new class of cryptographic algorithms (pseudo-random permutation generators) which do not run for the predefined number of steps. Instead, these algorithms stop according to a stopping rule defined as SST, for which one can obtain provable properties: a) results are perfect samples from uniform distribution, b) immunity to timing attacks (no information about the resulting permutation leaks through the information about the number of steps SST algorithm performed).
Ç

INTRODUCTION
I N the traditional cryptography primitives are treated as mathematical objects, security definitions involve blackbox model: it is assumed that an adversary has only access to inputs and outputs of a given cryptographic scheme. In reality however, a device, or a particular implementation, may expose lots of additional side-channel information, the running time being one of the most important. It can be particularly dangerous, since one can often measure the time even without physical access to the device. Attacks exploiting this are called timing attacks. Algorithm 1. Simple Modular Exponentiation c d mod n Require: c; d ¼ d s d sÀ1 Á Á Á d 1 d 0 ; d i 2 f0; 1g 1: x ¼ 1 2: for i = s to 0 do 3: x ¼ modðx Á x; nÞ 4: if d i == 1 then 5:
x ¼ modðx Á c; nÞ 6: end if 7: end for 8: return x Straightforward implementations of RSA used the modular exponentiation algorithm as described in Algorithm 1 together with Algorithm 2. An adversary, by careful selection of messages c, and just by measuring the time it takes to compute the result is able to completely recover d -the private key (since the number of times line number 2 of the Algorithm 2 and line number 5 of the Algorithm 1 are called depends both on c and d). Kocher [16] was the first one to discuss timing attacks.
How can one prevent timing attacks? There are two natural approaches: A1) Constant-time implementation. Re-implementing the algorithm in such a way that the running time is data independent (it runs in the same time on all possible inputs). A2) Masking (blinding). Use some extra randomness in such a way that time-dependent operations are performed on random inputs. The A1 approach is self-explaining. However, not all algorithms are easily transformable to constant time ones. Moreover, the compiler in some cases can optimize the algorithm resulting in data-dependent running time again, or a constant-time implementation on one platform may become again time attack susceptible on a different platform-see [23] , [25] .
In this paper we focus our attention on masking (i.e., A2) by performing some "random" permutation first, which is key-dependent.
Authors of [7] presented fast constant-time algorithms for code-based public-key cryptography called McBits.
McBits uses a permutation network to achieve immunity against cache-timing attacks. Permutation network is a network built up of wires and comparators. Wires carry values while comparators sort values between two wires (smaller value goes to the upper wires, bigger value goes to the lower wires). Permutation network is a fixed construction: number of wires and comparators is fixed. When such a network has the property that it sorts all inputs, then it is called a sorting network.
In Section 5 of [7] on "Secret permutations" authors write (where a permutation is considered as the output of a permutation network) "By definition a permutation network can reach every permutation, but perhaps it is much more likely to reach some permutations than others. Perhaps this hurts security. Perhaps not [. . .]"
Above motivation leads to the following question:
How to obtain a key-based permutation which is indistinguishable from a truly random one?
The doubt about the resulting permutation in [7] can come from the following: one can have a recipe for constructing a permutation involving some number of single steps, determining however the necessary number of steps is not trivial. In this paper we resolve the issue, our considerations are Markov chain based. In particular, we consider some card shuffling schemes. Our methods can have two applications: we can determine number of steps so that we are arbitrary close to uniform permutation; in so-called SST version algorithm does not run pre-defined number of steps, but instead it stops once randomness is reached. As a side-effect we have a detailed analysis of some existing stream ciphers. Many stream ciphers (e.g., RC4, RC4A [28] , RC4+ [29] , VMPC [31] , Spritz [27] ) are composed of two algorithms: 1) KSA (Key Scheduling Algorithm) uses a secret key to transform identity permutation of n elements into some other permutation. 2) PRGA (Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm) starts with a permutation generated by KSA and outputs random bits from it (some function of the permutation and the current step number) while updating the permutation at the same time. KSAs of all aforementioned algorithms (RC4, RC4A, Spritz, RC4+, VMPC) can be seen as performing some card shuffling, where a secret key corresponds to/replaces randomness. If we consider a version of the algorithm with purely random secret key of infinite length, then we indeed consider a card shuffling procedure. Following [21] , we will refer to such a version of the algorithm as an idealized version. In the case of KSA used by RC4 the idealized version (mathematical model) of the card shuffle is called Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions shuffle.
The KSA s of mentioned ciphers perform shuffling for some predefined number of steps. The security of such a scheme is mainly based on analyzing idealized version of the algorithm and corresponds to the "quality of a shuffling". Roughly speaking, shuffling is considered as a Markov chain on permutations, all of them converge to uniform distribution (perfectly shuffled cards). Then we should perform as many steps as needed to be close to this uniform distribution, what is directly related to the so-called mixing time. This is one of the main drawbacks of RC4: it performs Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions for n steps, whereas the mixing time is of the order n log n.
There is a long list of papers which point out weaknesses of the RC4 algorithm. Attacks exploited both weaknesses of PRGA and KSA or the way RC4 was used in specific systems [5] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [19] . As a result, in 2015 RC4 was prohibited in TLS by IETF, Microsoft and Mozilla.
In the paper we use so-called Strong Stationary Times (SST) for Markov chains. The main area of application of SSTs is studying the rate of convergence of a chain to its stationary distribution. However, they may also be used for perfect sampling from stationary distribution of a Markov chain, consult [26] (on Coupling From The Past algorithm) and [12] (on algorithms involving Strong Stationary Times and Strong Stationary Duality).
This paper is an extension (and applications to timing attacks) of [17] presented at Mycrypt 2016 conference.
Related Work-Timing Attacks
Kocher [16] was first to observe that information about the time it takes a given cryptographic implementation to compute the result may leak information about the secret (or private) key. Timing attack may be treated as the most dangerous kind of side-channel attacks since it may be exploited even by a remote adversary while most of other types of side-channel attacks are distance bounded. Kocher discussed presented timing attacks on RSA, DSS and on symmetric key encryption schemes.
Similar timing attack was implemented for CASCADE smart cards [10] . Authors report recovering 512-bit key after 350.000 timing measurements (few minutes in late 90 s). Later, Brumley and Boneh [8] showed that timing attacks may be performed remotely and on algorithms that were previously not considered vulnerable (RSA using Chinese Remainder Theorem).
The usual way of dealing with timing attacks is to attempt to re-implement a given scheme in such a way that it runs the same number of steps (i.e., approach A1), no matter what the input is. This approach has the following drawbacks: 1) it requires to replace cryptographic hardware, 2) it is hard to do it right, 3) it badly influences the performance.
(1) The first limitation is quite obvious. So it may be worth considering the idea of reusing a timing attack susceptible implementation by masking (see Section 1.1.1) its inputs. This was the original timing attack countermeasure technique proposed by Kocher for both RSA and DSS. (2) An example of s2n-Amazon's TLS implementation and its rough road to become immune to timing attacks [2] shows that achieving timing resistance is not easy. It is not an isolated case, it may be hard to achieve constant time in the case of of implementation [24] but what may be more worrying, even a change at the architecture level may not lead to success [30] . (3) BearSSL is an implementation of TLS protocol which consists of many constant time implementations (along with a "traditional" ones) of the main cryptographic primitives. Constant-time implementation of CBC encryption for AES is 5.89 times slower than the "standard" implementation [25] . On a reference platform it achieves the following performance: AES-CBC (encryption, big): 161.40 MB/s while the constant time (optimized for 64-bit architecture) has 27.39 MB/s. The slow-down is not always at the same rate, it depends on both the function and on the mode of operation used (for AES in CTR mode the slowdown is 1.86; for 3DES it is 3.10).
Masking
Let F ðÁÞ be the RSA decryption (described as Algorithm 1) implementation which uses a private key ½d; N to decrypt an encrypted message x e mod N. The following shows how to design F which is immune to timing attacks but reuses implementation of F . The approach proposed by Kocher [16] is to run a bad implementation F on a random input (same idea as Chaum's blind-signatures [9] ), the code for F is presented in Algorithm 3. The security of this approach comes from the fact that while the running time of G is not constant, an attacker cannot deduce information about the key, because it does not know the input to the F . This is because xr e mod N is a random number uniformly distributed in Z Ã N . The beauty of this approach lies in the fact that F is actually run on a random input. After applying F one can easily get rid of it. To be more precise: let g 1 ðx; rÞ ¼ xr e mod N and let g 2 ðx; rÞ ¼ xr À1 mod N then Gðd; xÞ ¼ g 2 ðF ðd; g 1 ðx; rÞÞ; rÞ ¼ F ðd; xÞ (both g 1 and g 2 depend on the public key ½N; e). Taking advantage of properties of the underlying group lets us to remove the randomness r (which remains secret to the attacker during the computations).
Similar approach can be applied to other public key schemes e.g., RSA signatures, DSA signatures. It is unknown how this approach-how to design G-may be applied to symmetric-key cryptographic schemes without introducing any changes to the original function F .
Our Contribution
(1) Strong stationary time based PRNGs (Pseudo Random Number Generators). Instead of running a PRNG algorithm for some pre-defined number of steps, we make it randomized (Las Vegas algorithm). As far as we are aware the idea of key-dependent running time in context of symmetric ciphers was not considered earlier. To be more specific we suggest utilization of so-called Strong Stationary Times for Markov chains. We use SST to obtain samples from uniform distribution on all permutations (we actually perform perfect sampling). Few things needs pointing out: 1) In McBits [7] construction, authors perform similar masking by performing some permutation. This is achieved via a permutation network. However, they: a) run it for a pre-defined number of steps (they are unsure if the resulting permutation is random); b) they work hard to make the implementation constant-time. Utilization of SST allows to obtain a perfect sample from uniform distribution (once SST rule is found, we have it "for free"). This is a general concept which may be applied to many algorithms. 2) Coupling methods are most commonly used tool for studying the rate of convergence to stationarity for Markov chains. They allow to bound the so-called total variation distance between the distribution of given chain at time instant k and its stationary distribution. However, the (traditional) security definitions require something "stronger". It turns out that bounding separation distance is what one actually needs. It fits perfectly into the notion of Strong Stationary Times we are using (see Section 2.3). 3) By construction, the running time of our model is key dependent. In extreme cases (very unlikely) it may leak some information about the key, but it does not leak any information about the resulting permutation to an adversary. We elaborate more on this in Section 6.5. (2) Preventing timing attacks. We present a technique which allows to obtain a timing attack immune implementation of a symmetric key encryption scheme by re-using a timing attack vulnerable scheme. The technique follows ideas of Kocher's masking of the RSA algorithm and are similar in nature to the utilization of a permutation network in McBits.
The idea is that an input to a timing-attack vulnerable function is first a subject to a pseudo-random permutation. The permutation is generated (from a secret key) via SSTbased pseudo-random permutation generation algorithm.
The main properties of such an approach are following: the resulting permutation is uniformly random provided the long enough key is applied; the running time of an SSTbased algorithm does not reveal any information about the resulting permutation.
Based on our straightforward implementation, we show that the performance of our approach is similar to constanttime implementations available in BearSSL [25] , see Section 7, Fig. 7 (but does not require that much effort and caution to implement it right).
(3) Analysis of idealized models of existing cryptographic schemes. The approach, in principle, allows us to analyze the quality of existing PRNGs, closing the gap between theoretical models and practice. The "only" thing which must be done for a given scheme is to find an SST for the corresponding shuffle and to analyze its properties. We present in-depth analysis of RC4's KSA algorithm. As a result of Mironov's [21] work, one knows that the idealized version of RC4's KSA would need keys of length % 23 037 in order to meet the mathematical model. Similarly as in [21] , we propose SST which is valid for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions and Random-to-Random Transpositions. For the latter one we calculate the mixing time which is "faster". It is known that Random-to-Random Transpositions card shuffling needs 1 2 n log n steps to mix. It is worth mentioning that this shuffling scheme and Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions are similar in the spirit, it does not transfer automatically that the latter one also needs 1 2 n log n steps to mix. Mironov [21] states that the expected time till reaching uniform distribution is upper bounded by 2nH n À n, we show that the expected running time for this SST applied to Random-to-Random Transpositions is equal to
(H n is the nth harmonic number) and empirically check that the result is similar for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions. This directly translates into the required steps that should be performed by RC4.
In fact one may use a better shuffling than the one that is used in RC4, e.g., time-reversed riffle shuffle which requires (on average) 4096 bits-not much more than 2048 bits which are allowed for RC4 (see Section 5).
PRELIMINARY
Throughout the paper, let S n denote a set of all permutations of a set f1; . . . ; ng ¼: ½n.
Markov Chains and Rate of Convergence
Consider an ergodic Markov chain X ¼ fX k ; k ! 0g on a finite state space E ¼ f0; . . . ; M À 1g with a stationary distribution c. Let LðX k Þ denote the distribution of the chain at time instant k. By the rate of convergence we understand the knowledge on how fast the distribution of the chain converges to its stationary distribution. We have to measure it according to some distance dist. Define
which is called mixing time (w.r.t. given distance dist). In our case the state space is the set of all permutations of ½n, i.e., E :¼ S n . The stationary distribution is the uniform distribution over E, i.e., cðsÞ ¼ 1 n! for all s 2 E. In most applications the mixing time is defined w.r.t. total variation distance
The separation distance is defined by sepðLðX k Þ; cÞ :¼ max
It is relatively easy to check that d TV ðLðX k Þ; cÞ sep ðLðX k Þ; cÞ.
Strong Stationary Times. The definition of separation distance fits perfectly into the notion of Strong Stationary Times for Markov chains. This is a probabilistic tool for studying the rate of convergence of Markov chains allowing also perfect sampling. We can think of stopping time as of a running time of an algorithm which observes a Markov chain X and which stops according to some stopping rule (depending only on the past). 
Random variable T is a Strong Stationary
Time if it is a randomized stopping time for chain X such that
Having SST T lets us bound the following (see [4] ) sepðLðX k Þ; cÞ PrðT > kÞ:
(1)
Distinguishers and Security Definition
In this section we define a Permutation distinguisher-we consider its advantage in a traditional cryptographic security definition. That is, a Permutation distinguisher is given a permutation p and needs to decide whether p is a result of a given (pseudo-random) algorithm or if p is a permutation selected uniformly at random from the set of all permutations of a given size. The upper bound on Permutation distinguisher's advantage is an upper bound on any possible distinguisher-even those which are not bounded computationally. Additionally, in the Section 4.1 we consider Sign distinguisher. Permutation distinguisher. The distinguishability game for the adversary is as follows (Algorithm 5): 1) S is initialized with: a) a key generated uniformly at random K $ U ðf0; 1g rm Þ, b) S 0 ¼ p 0 (identity permutation) 2) S is run for r rounds: S r :¼ SðKÞ and produces a permutation p r . 3) We set: c 0 :¼ p rand a random permutation from uniform distribution is chosen, c 1 :¼ p r : 4) A challenge bit b 2 f0; 1g is chosen at random, permutation c b is sent to the Adversary. 5) Adversary replies with b 0 . 6) The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b 0 ¼ b, and 0 otherwise.
In the case when the adversary wins the game (if b ¼ b 0 ) we say that A succeeded. The adversary wins the game if it can distinguish the random permutation from the permutation being a result of the PRPG algorithm. 
Strong Stationary Times and Security Guarantees
Coupling method is a commonly used tool for bounding the rate of convergence of Markov chains. Roughly speaking, a coupling of a Markov chain X with a transition matrix P is a bivariate chain ðX 0 ; X 00 Þ such that marginally X 0 and X 00 are Markov chains with the transition matrix P and once the chains meet they stay together (in some definitions this condition can be relaxed). Let then
., the first time chains meet, called coupling time. The coupling inequality states that d TV ðLðX k Þ; cÞ PrðT c > kÞ.
On the other hand, separation distance is an upper bound on total variation distance, i.e., d TV ðLðX k Þ; cÞ sepðLðX k Þ; cÞ. At first glance it seems that it is better to directly bound d TV , since we can have d TV very small, whereas sep is (still) large. However, knowing that sep is small gives us much more than just knowing that d TV is small, what turns out to be crucial for proving security guarantees (i.e., Definition 2.5). In our case (E ¼ S n and c is a uniform distribution on E) having d TV small, i.e., d TV ðL ðX k Þ; cÞ ¼ 1 2 P s2S n PrðX k ¼ sÞ À 1 n! "does not imply that jPrðX k ¼ sÞ À 1 n! j is uniformly small (i.e., of order 1 n! ). Knowing however that sepðLðX k Þ; cÞ " implies
Above inequality is what we need in our security definitions and shows that the notion of separation distance is an adequate measure of mixing time for our applications. It is worth noting that d TV ðLðX k Þ; UðEÞÞ " implies (see Theorem 7 in [3] ) that sepðLðX 2k Þ; UðEÞÞ ". This means that proof of security which bounds directly total variation distance by " would require twice as many bits of randomness compared to the result which guarantees " bound on the separation distance.
SHUFFLING CARDS
In this Section we consider four chains X ðT 2RÞ ; X ðRTRT Þ ; X ðCTRT Þ ; X ðRSÞ corresponding to known shuffling schemes:
Top-To-Random, Random-To-Random Transpositions, Cyclic-To-Random Transpositions and Riffle Shuffle (we actually consider its time reversal). The state space of all chains is E ¼ S n . The generic state is denoted by S 2 E, where S½j denotes the position of element j. Rough description of one step of each shuffling (in each shuffling "random" corresponds to the uniform distribution) is following: X ðT 2RÞ : choose random position j and move the card S½1 (i.e., which is currently on top) to this position. X ðRTRT Þ : choose two positions i and j at random and swap cards S½i and S½j. X ðCTRT Þ : at step t choose random position j and swap cards S½ðt mod nÞ þ 1 and S½j. X ðRSÞ : assign each card random bit. Put all cards with bit assigned 0 to the top keeping relative positions of these cards. The stationary distribution of all the chains is uniform, i.e., cðsÞ ¼ 1 n! for all s 2 E. Aforementioned Strong Stationary Time is one of the methods to study rate of convergence. Probably the simplest (in description) is an SST for X ðT 2RÞ :
Wait until the card which is initially at the bottom reaches the top, then make one step more.
Denote this time by T ðT 2RÞ . In this classical example T ðT 2RÞ corresponds to the classical coupon collector problem. We know that PrðT ðT 2RÞ > n log n þ cnÞ e Àc , thus via (1) we have
This bound is actually tight, in a sense that there is a so-called cutoff at n log n, see Aldous and Diaconis [3] .
The chain X ðRTRT Þ mixes at 1 2 n log n, the result was first proven by Diaconis and Shahshahani [11] with analytical methods, Matthews [20] provided construction of SST for this chain.
There is a simple construction of SST for X ðRSÞ : initially consider all pairs of cards as unmarked. Then, if at some step cards in some pair were assigned different bits mark this pair. Stop at the first time when all pairs are marked. This SST yields in 2n log 2 n mixing time (the actual answer is that ð3=2Þn log 2 n steps are enough).
The case X ðCTRT Þ is a little bit more complicated. Having SST T does not automatically imply that we are able to bound PrðT > kÞ, or even calculate ET . This is due to the cyclic structure of the shuffle. Note that "in spirit"X ðCTRT Þ is similar to X ðRTRT Þ , which-as mentioned-mixes at 1 2 n log n (and even more-there is a so-called cutoff at this value, meaning that "most of the action happens" around 1 2 n log n). Mironov [21] (in context of analysis of RC4) showed that it takes Oðn log nÞ for this shuffle to mix. Unfortunately Mironov's "estimate of the rate of growth of the strong stationary time T is quite loose" and results "are a far cry both from the provable upper and lower bounds on the convergence rate". He:
proved an upper bound Oðn log nÞ. More precisely Mironov showed that there exists some positive constant c such that P ½T > cn log n ! 0 when n ! 1: Author experimentally checked that P ½T > 2n lg n < 1=n for n ¼ 256 which corresponds to P ½T > 4096 < 1=256. experimentally showed that E½T % 11:16n % 1:4n lg n % 2857 (for n ¼ 256)-which translates into: on average one needs to drop % 2601 initial bytes. Later Mosel, Peres and Sinclair [22] proved a matching lower bound establishing mixing time to be of order Qðn log nÞ. However, the constant was not determined.
One can apply the following approach: find T which is a proper SST for both X ðCTRT Þ and X ðRTRT Þ , calculate its expectation for X ðRTRT Þ and show experimentally that the expectation is similar for X ðCTRT Þ . This is the main part of this Section resulting in a conjecture that the mixing time of X ðCTRT Þ is n log n.
Mironov's SST for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions
Let us recall Mironov's [21] construction of SST:
"At the beginning all cards numbered 0; . . . ; n À 2 are unchecked, the ðn À 1Þ th card is checked. Whenever the shuffling algorithm exchanges two cards, S½i and S½j, one of the two rules may apply before the swap takes place:
a. If S½i is unchecked and
The event T happens when all cards become checked."
Then the author proves that this is a SST for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions and shows that there exists constant c (can be chosen less than 30) such that Pr½T > cn log n ! 0 when n ! 1. Note that this marking scheme is also valid for Random-to-Random Transpositions shuffling, for which we have: Lemma 1. The expected running time of Random-to-Random Transpositions shuffling with Mironov stopping rule is ET ¼ 2nH n À n þ OðH n Þ:
Proof. We start with one card checked. When k cards are checked, then probability of checking another one is equal to p k ¼ ðnÀkÞðkþ1Þ
. Thus, the time to check all the cards is distributed as a sum of geometric random variables and its expectation is equal to:
Better SST for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions
We suggest another "faster" SST which is valid for both Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions and Random-to-Random Transpositions. We will calculate its expectation and variance for Random-to-Random Transpositions and check experimentally that it is similar if the stopping rule is applied to Cyclicto-Random Transpositions.
The SST is given in StoppingRuleKLZ algorithm. 
Proof. First phase of the procedure (i.e., the case when there are less than dðn À 1Þ=2e cards marked) is a construction a random permutation of marked cards by placing unmarked cards on randomly chosen unoccupied positions-this is actually the first part of Matthews's [20] marking scheme. Second phase is simply a Broder's construction. Theorem 9. in [21] shows that this is a valid SST for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions. Both phases combined produce a random permutation of all cards. t u Remark 1. One important remark should be pointed. Full
Matthews's marking [20] scheme is an SST which is "faster" than ours. However, although it is valid for Random-to-Random Transpositions, it is not valid for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions.
Calculating ET or VarT seems to be a challenging task. But note that marking scheme StoppingRuleKLZ also yields a valid SST for Random-to-Random Transpositions. In next Lemma we calculate ET and VarT for this shuffle, later we experimentally show that ET is very similar for both marking schemes.
Lemma 3. Let T be the SST StoppingRuleKLZ applied to
Random-to-Random Transpositions. Then we have
where fðkÞ $ gðkÞ means that lim k!1 fðkÞ gðkÞ ¼ 1. Proof. Define T k to be the first time when k cards are marked (thus T T n ). Let d ¼ dðn À 1Þ=2e. Then T d is the running time of the first phase and T n À T d ð Þis the running time of the second phase. Denote
Assume that there are k < d marked cards at a certain step. Then the new card will be marked in next step if we choose two unmarked cards what happens with probability p a ðkÞ ¼ ðn À kÞ 2 n 2 :
Thus Y k is a geometric random variable with parameter p a ðkÞ and
Now assume that there are k ! d cards marked at a certain step. Then, the new card will be marked in next step with probability
and Y k is a geometric random variable with parameter p a ðkÞ. Thus
For variance we have 
Finally,
The expectation of the following SSTs applied to Random-to-Random Transpositions shuffling scheme is known:
Mironov's SST (used in [21] ) it is 2nH n À n StoppingRuleKLZ SST it is nðH n þ 1Þ As shown, both marking schemes are valid for both, Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions and Random-to-Random Transpositions shufflings. For both stopping rules applied to Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions no precise results on expected running times are known. Instead we estimated them via simulations, simply running 10.000 of them. The results are given in Fig. 1 .
The conclusion is that they do not differ much. This suggests the following: Conjecture 1. The mixing time t sep mix for Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions converges to n log n as n ! 1.
Optimal Shuffling
Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions is the shuffle used in RC4 and in Spritz. To reach stationarity (i.e., produce random permutation), as we have shown, one needs to perform Oðn log nÞ steps. In each step we use a random number from interval ½0; . . . ; n À 1, thus this shuffling requires Oðn log 2 nÞ random bits.
One can ask the following question: Is this shuffling optimal in terms of required bits? The answer is no. The entropy of the uniform distribution on ½n is Oðn log nÞ (since there are n! permutations of ½n), thus one could expect that optimal shuffling would require this number of bits. Applying described Riffle Shuffle yields SST with ET ¼ 2 lg n, at each step n random bits are used, thus this shuffling requires 2n lg n random bits, matching the requirement of optimal shuffle (up to a constant).
In Fig. 2 we summarized required number of bits for various algorithms and stopping rules.
Perfect Shuffle
Let X be an ergodic chain with a stationary distribution c. Ergodicity means that nevertheless of initial distribution, the distribution LðX k Þ converges, in some sense, to c as k ! 1 (it is enough to think of d TV ðLðX k Þ; cÞ converging to 0 as k ! 1). Beside some trivial situations, the distribution of LðX k Þ is never equal to c for any finite k. That is why we need to study mixing time to know how close LðX k Þ to c is. However, there are methods for so-called perfect simulations. This term refers to the art of converting a Markov chain into the algorithm which (if stops) returns exact (unbiased) sample from stationary distribution of the chain. The most famous one is the Coupling From The Past (CFTP) algorithm introduced in [26] . The ingenious idea is to realize the chain as evolving from the past. However, to apply algorithm effectively the chain must be so-called realizable monotone, which is defined w.r.t some underlying partial ordering. Since we consider random walk on permutations, applying CFTP seems to be a challenging task.
However, having Strong Stationary Time rule we can actually perform perfect simulation(!). We simply run the chain until event SST occurs. At this time, the Definition 2.2 implies, that the distribution of the chain is stationary.
It is worth mentioning that all SSTs mentioned at the beginning of this Section are deterministic (i.e., they are deterministic functions of the path of the chain, they do not use any extra randomness -it is not the case for general SST). For a method for perfect simulation based on SST (and other methods) see [18] , where mainly monotonicity requirements for three perfect sampling algorithms are considered.
(NOT SO) RANDOM SHUFFLES OF RC-REVISITED
RC4 algorithm. RC4 is a stream cipher, its so-called internal state is ðS; i; jÞ, where S is a permutation of ½n and i; j are some two indices. As input it takes LÀ byte message m 1 ; . . . ; m L and a secret key K and returns ciphertext c 1 ; . . . ; c L . The initial state is the output of KSA. Based on this state PRGA is used to output bits which are XORed with the message. The actual KSA algorithm used in RC4 is presented in Fig. 3 together with its idealized version KSA Ã (where a secret key-based randomness is replaced with pure randomness) The goal of KSA of original RC4 is to produce a pseudorandom permutation of n ¼ 256 cards. The original algorithm performs 256 steps of Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions. Even if we replace j :¼ j þ S½i þ K½i mod l in KSA with j ¼ randomðnÞ (i.e., we actually consider idealized version), then Qðn log nÞ steps are needed. Considering idealized version was a main idea of Mironov [21] . Moreover, he showed that 2n log n steps are enough. However, our result stated in Lemma 3 together with experimental results from Section 3.3 imply that around n log n steps are enough. Moreover, if we consider KSA with Random-to-Random Transpositions (instead of Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions) then we can state more formal theorem in terms of introduced security definitions. i.e., r ¼ t sep mix ðc À2 Þ. Taking c ¼ 1 ffiffiffiffi ffi n!" p we perform Random-to-Random Transpositions for r ¼ t sep mix ðn!"Þ steps, i.e., sepðL ðX r Þ; cÞ n!" Inequality (2) implies that jPrðX r ¼ sÞÀ 1 n! j " for any permutation s and thus completes the proof. t u
Sign Distinguisher for or Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions
Sign distinguisher. For a permutation p which has a representation of non-trivial transpositions p ¼ ða 1 b 1 Þða 2 b 2 Þ . . . ða m b m Þ the sign is defined as: signðpÞ ¼ ðÀ1Þ m . So the value of the sign is þ1 whenever m is even and is equal to À1 whenever m is odd. The distinguisher is presented in Fig. 4 . It was observed in [21] that the sign of the permutation at the end of RC4's KSA algorithm is not uniform. And as a conclusion it was noticed that the number of discarded shuffles (by PRGA) must grow at least linearly in n. Below we present this result obtained in a different way than in [21] , giving the exact formula for advantage at any step t.
One can look at the sign-change process for the Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions as follows: after the table is initialized, sign of the permutation is þ1 since it is identity so the initial distribution is concentrated in v 0 ¼ ðPrðsignðZ 0 Þ ¼ þ1Þ; PrðsignðZ 0 Þ ¼ À1ÞÞ ¼ ð1; 0Þ. Fig. 2 . Comparison between number of bits used by RC4 (40 to 2048) and required by mathematical models (Mironov [21] and ours-KSA KLZ ) versus length of the key for the time-reversed riffle shuffle. Bits asymptotics approximates the number of fresh bits required by the mathematical model (number of bits required by the underlying Markov chain to converge to stationary distribution). Bits required is (rounded) value of # bits asymptotics when n ¼ 256. Then in each step the sign is unchanged if and only if i ¼ j which happens with probability 1=n. So the transition matrix M n of a sign-change process induced by the shuffling process is equal to
This conclusion corresponds to looking at the distribution of the sign-change process after t steps: v 0 Á M t n , where v 0 is the initial distribution. The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of M n are ð1; 2Àn n Þ and ð1; 1Þ T ; ðÀ1; 1Þ T respectively. The spectral decomposition yields v 0 Á M t n ¼ ð1; 0Þ
In Fig. 5 the advantage of a sign-adversary after dropping k bytes of the output (so after n þ k steps of the shuffle, for the mathematical model) is presented. For n ¼ 256 (which corresponds to the value of n used in RC4) and initial distribution being identity permutation after t ¼ n ¼ 256 steps one gets: v 0 Á M 256 256 ¼ ð0:567138; 0:432862Þ. In [19] it was suggested that the first 512 bytes of the output should be dropped.
STRONG STATIONARY TIME BASED KSA ALGORITHMS
In addition to KSA and KSA Ã (given in Fig. 3) we introduce another version called KSA ÃÃ Shuffle;ST (n). The main difference is that it does not run a predefined number of steps, but it takes some procedure ST as a parameter (as well as Shuffle procedure). The idea is that it must be a rule corresponding to Strong Stationary Time for given shuffling scheme. The KSA ÃÃ Shuffle;ST (n) is given in the following algorithm: The algorithm works as follows. It starts with identity permutation. Then at each step it performs some card shuffling procedure Shuffle. Instead of running it for a pre-defined number of steps, it runs until an event defined by a procedure ST occurs. The procedure ST is designed in such a way that it guarantees that the event is a Strong Stationary Time. At each step the algorithm uses new randomness-one can think about that as of an idealized version but when the length of a key is greater than the number of random bits required by the algorithm then we end up with a permutation which cannot be distinguished from a random (uniform) one (even by a computationally unbounded adversary).
Notational convention: in KSA ÃÃ
Shuffle;ST (n) we omit parameter n. Moreover, if Shuffle and ST are omitted it means that we use Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions as shuffling procedure and stopping rule is clear from the context. Note that if we use for stopping rule ST "stop after n steps" (which of course is not SST), it is equivalent to RC4's KSA Ã .
Given a shuffling procedure Shuffle one wants to have a "fast" stopping rule ST (perfectly one wants an optimal SST which is stochastically the smallest). The stopping rule ST is a parameter, since for a given shuffling scheme one can come up with a better stopping rule(s). This is exactly the case with Cyclic-to-Random Transpositions and Random-to-Random Transpositions. In Section 3 we recalled Mironov's [21] stopping rule as well as new introduced "faster" rule called (called StoppingRuleKLZ).
Let us point out few important properties of KSA ÃÃ Shuffle;ST (n) algorithm:
P1 The resulting permutation is purely random. P2 The information about the number of rounds that an SST-algorithm performs does not reveal any information about the resulting permutation. The property P1 is due to the fact that we actually perform perfect simulation (see Section 3.5). The property P2 follows from the fact that the Definition 5.1 is equivalent to the following one (see [4] ):
Definition 5.1. Random variable T is Strong Stationary Time if it is a randomized stopping time for chain X such that: X T has distribution c and is independent of T:
The property P1 is the desired property of the output of the KSA algorithm, whereas P2 turns out to be crucial for our timing attacks applications (details in Section 6).
TIMING ATTACKS AND SST
In the black box model (for CPA-security experiment), an adversary has access to an oracle computing encryptions F ðk; ÁÞ for a secret key k. So the adversary is allowed to obtain a vector of cryptograms (c 1 ; . . . ; c q ) for plaintexts (m 1 ; . . . ; m q ) of its choice (where each c i ¼ r i ; y i h i¼ F ðk; m i ; r i Þ). Each r i is the randomness used by the oracle to compute encryption (e.g., its initial counter ctr for CTR-mode, IV for CBC-mode etc.). So the adversary has a vector of tuples O BlackBox;F ¼ m i ; c i h i¼ m i ; F ðk; m i ; r i Þ h i :
In the real world, as a result of interacting with an implementation of F , a timing information may also be accessible to an adversary. In such a case her knowledge is a vector of tuples
where t i is the time to reply with c i on query m i and randomness used r i . (A very similar information is accessible to an adversary in chosen-ciphertext attacks.) An encryption scheme is susceptible to a timing attack when there exists an efficient function H which on input H m 1 ; c 1 ; t 1 h i ; . . . ; m w ; c w ; t w h i ð Þ outputs ðkÞ (some function of a secret key k). Depending on the scheme and on a particular implementation the leakage function can be of various forms e.g., ðkÞ ¼ HW ðkÞ -the Hamming weight of k, or in the best case ðkÞ ¼ k.
The reason why a timing attack on implementation of a function F (y ¼ F ðk; xÞ) is possible is because the running time of F is not the same on each input. Usually timing attacks focus on a particular part of Ff weak which operates on a function h x of the original input x and on a function h k of the original key (e.g., h k may be a substring of a round key). When F ðk; xÞ ¼ f rest ðk; f weak ðk; xÞÞ the statistical model is built and T ðF ðk; xÞÞ ¼ T ðf weak ðk; xÞÞ þ T ðf rest ðk; f weak ðk; xÞÞÞ. The distribution of T ðf weak ðk; xÞÞ is conditioned on k and estimating this value (conditioned on subset of bits of k) is the goal of the adversary.
Countermeasures-Approach I
There is one common approach to eliminate possibility of timing attacks, namely to re-implement F (ctðF Þ ¼ becomes the same as in the black-box model.
Countermeasures-Approach II
The other approach is to still use a weak implementation, but "blind" (mask) the adversary's view. Let us start with a public-key example, described in the Section 1.1.1. The RSA's fragile decryption F ðd; cÞ ¼ f weak ðd; cÞ (Algorithm 1) is implemented with masking (Algorithm 8, depicted in Fig. 6 ) as: F masked ðd; cÞ ¼ g 2 ðf weak ðd; g 1 ðc; rÞÞ; rÞ, where g 1 ðc; rÞ ¼ cr e mod N and g 2 ðx; rÞ ¼ xr À1 mod N. In this case, the adversary's view is
While t i are again different, they depend on both d and g 1 ðc i ; r i Þ, but an adversary does not obtain information about random r i 's and thous information about t i is useless.
Algorithm 8. G-Timing Attack Immune Encryption Based on Timing Attack Susceptible Symmetric Encryption F
Require: x; F; g 1 ; g 2 ; k f ; k g 1: compute y 1 ¼ g 1 ðk g ; xÞ 2: compute y 2 ¼ F ðk f ; y 1 Þ 3: return y ¼ g 2 ðk g ; y 2 Þ
Non-Constant Time Implementation Immune to Timing Attacks for Symmetric Encryption
Let us use the similar approach for the symmetric encryption case. For a time-attack susceptible function F we would like to build a function G by designing functions g 1 ðÁÞ and g 2 ðÁÞ and then to define Gðk; xÞ ¼ g 2 ðF ðk; g 1 ðx; ÁÞÞ; ÁÞ:
We restrict ourselves only to functions G of that form. We do not require that Gðk; xÞ ¼ F ðk; xÞ as it was in the public key case. It would be enough for us that there exists an efficient algorithm for decryption -this is satisfied if both g 1 ; g 2 have efficiently computable inversions. Now let us consider the following approaches for selecting g 1 (and g 2 ) 1) g 1 ðxÞ-then such an approach is trivially broken because an attacker knows exactly what is the input to F . 2) g 1 ðx; rÞ for a randomly selected r generated during run of G. Assuming that r cannot be efficiently removed from F ðk; g 1 ðx; rÞÞ via application of g 2 , the ciphertext of G would need to include r but then this is exactly the same case as (1). 3) g 1 ðk; xÞ-in that case an attacker might want to perform a timing attack on g 1 -one would need to guarantee that g 1 itself is immune to timing attacks. This approach is used in McBits [7] system, g 1 is a constant-time implementation of Bene s permutation network [6] . 4) g 1 ðk; x; rÞ-again value r would need to be included in ciphertext generated by G but now for an attacker this case would be no easier than when g 1 depends solely on k (just as in the case 3). While g 2 cannot remove randomness (unless F is trivially broken) and the randomness used in g 1 needs to be included in the ciphertext, one needs g 2 anyway. It is required for the protection in the case when attacker has access to the decryption oracle-then g 2 plays the same role as g 1 plays for protecting against timing attacks during encryption.
We suggest the following approach, let k ¼ ðk f ; k g Þ where k f is a portion of the secret key used by F : 1) Let g 1 ðk g ; xÞ; g 2 ðk g ; xÞ be permutations of n ¼ jxj bits depending on a key i.e. g 1 ðk g ; ÁÞ and g 2 ðk f ; ÁÞ are permutations constructed based on k g and k f respectively, which are later on applied to x, a sequence of n bits (similarly as in McBits scheme) 2) Both g 1 ; g 2 are the permutations obtained as a result of KSA ÃÃ Shuffle;ST algorithm-one has a freedom in the choice of a shuffle algorithm.
Algorithm 9. G À1 -Timing Attack Immune Decryption Implementation Based on Timing Attack Susceptible Symmetric Decryption F À1 Require: y; F À1 ; g À1 1 ; g À1 2 ; k f ; k g 1: compute
Resulting G has the following properties:
G1 Resulting permutation g 1 is uniformly random, provided a long enough k g is applied (see property P1 from Section 5). G2 For a given k g and for any x; x 0 one obtains T ðg 1 ðk g ; xÞÞ ¼ T ðg 1 ðk g ; x 0 ÞÞ (and the same holds for g 2 ) -while g 1 is a result of SST, running it for the same input k g leads to the same running time. G3 The running time of g 1 (and of g 2 ) does not reveal any information about the resulting permutation (see property P2). As a result, the adversary does not have influence on inputs to F . The property G3 guarantees security of the outputs of g 1 and g 2 and that they cannot be derived from the running time but it does no guarantee that k g will remain secure. It turns out that some bits of k g may leak through the information about the running time but:
there are at least n! (where n is the number of bits of x) different keys which have the same running time, the information which leaks from the running time does not let to obtain ANY information about the resulting permutation. For more details see Section 6.5.
Implementation
To implement the above construction, one needs (pseudo) random bits to generate a permutation g 1 . These bits can be obtained in the similar way, one may produce a key for authenticated encryption.
Let k be a 128-bit AES key. Calculate k g AES ðk; 0Þ, k g AES ðk; 1Þ, and k m AES ðk; 2Þ. Then AES ðk g ; IV Þ is used as a stream cipher to feed Riffle Shuffle until SST occurs, producing g 1 . The following bits in the same way produce g 2 . F is e.g., AES-128 in CBC or CTR mode, all having k f as a secret key. Then, k m may be used to compute the MAC (this disallows an adversary to play with e.g., hamming weight of inputs of g 1 ).
A proof of concept implementation was prepared (as a student project: https://bitbucket.org/dmirecki/bearssl/). This implementation first uses the AES key and riffle-shuffle to generate an array (permutation) which stores the permutation g 1 (of size 128). Then it permutes bits of the buffer by performing 128-step loop (line 34 of the Listing 1). 
Timing Attacks and KSA**
This section explains why bits of the secret key k g used to generate g 1 ; g 2 need to be distinct to the bits k f which are used by F . This is a simple conclusion of properties P1 and P2 (defined in Section 5) . The examples are intended to give a reader a better insights on the properties achieved by SST shuffling algorithms. As already mentioned -regardless the duration of SST algorithm adversary can learn something about the key, but has completely no knowledge about the resulting permutation. The examples will also show how a choice of a shuffling algorithm influences the leaking information about the key. In both cases we consider extreme (and very unlikely) situation where algorithm runs for the smallest number of steps.
Top-to-Random Card Shuffling
Consider the algorithm KSA ÃÃ T2R;ST with the shuffling procedure corresponding to Top-To-Random card shuffling: put the card which is currently on the top to the position j defined by the bits of the key k g in the current round. Recall stopping rule ST which is SST for this shuffle: stop one step after the card which was initially at the bottom reaches the top of the deck. Before the start of the algorithm, mark the last card (i.e., the card n is marked 1 ).
In Fig. 8a sample execution of the algorithm is presented (for n ¼ 8). It is an extreme situation in which SST was achieved after n steps (the lower bound for the running time) -please keep in mind that the expected running time of this SST is Oðn log nÞ. Based on this knowledge it is easy to observe that there is only one possible value of k g ½1 provided that SST lasted n stepsk g ½1 ¼ 111 ¼ ½8 n ½7; k g ½2 is either 110 or 111 so k g ½2 2 ½8 n ½6 and k g ½i 2 ½n n ½n À i for each i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. While some information about the key k g leaks from the fact that the SST stopped just after n steps, still no adversary can learn anything about the resulting permutation because every permutation is generated with exactly the same probability.
We showed an extreme case when SST algorithm for Top-To-Random runs the minimal number of steps n. Since k g ½i 2 ½n n ½n À i for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n so the number of bits of entropy of the secret key k g adversary learns each round i is equal to lg i. There are n! possible keys which result in running time n of SST. An adversary learns a fraction of n! out of 2 n lg n ¼ n n possible keys. Moreover it can predict a prefix of the k g with high probability.
Riffle Shuffle
Consider the algorithm KSA ÃÃ RS;ST with the shuffling procedure corresponding to (time reversal of) Riffle Shuffle. Recall the shuffling: at each step assign each card a random bit, then put all cards with bit assigned 0 to the top keeping the relative ordering. Sample execution is presented in Fig. 9 .
Recall the construction of SST for this example:
Consider, initially unmarked, all n 2 À Á pairs of cards; at each step mark pair ði; jÞ if cards i and j were assigned different bits.
Assume for simplicity that n is a power of 2. How many pairs can be marked in first step? For example, if there is only one bit equal to 0 and all other are equal to 1, then n À 1 pairs are marked. It is easy to see that the maximal number of pairs will be marked if exactly half (i.e., n 2 ) cards were assign bit 1 and other half were assign bit 0. Then n 2 4 pairs will be marked (all pairs of form ði; jÞ: i < j and cards i and j were assigned different bits). After such a step there will be two groups of cards: the ones assigned 0 and ones assigned 1. All pairs of cards within each group are not marked. Then again, to mark as many pairs as possible exactly half of the cards in each group must be assigned bit 0 and other half bit 1 -then n 2 8 new pairs will be marked. Iterating this procedure, we see that the shortest execution takes lgn steps after which all
pairs are marked. In Fig. 9 such sample execution is presented. There are exactly n! keys resulting in lg n steps of SST (each resulting in different permutation). Thus the adversary learns a tiny fraction of possible keys: n! out of 2 n lg n ¼ n n .
Summary
As we have seen the choice of shuffle algorithm matters for KSA ÃÃ . In any case the resulting permutation is not revealed at all, but some knowledge on key can be obtained. In both presented examples an adversary who observed that the Fig. 8 . Example run of top-to-random shuffle taken from the key k g of the length equal to 8 8-value bytes (24-bits) . Conditioning on the number of steps of the SST (in this case 8) one can find out that: out of the possible 2 24 keys only (exactly) 8! keys are possible (due to the fact that SST stopped exactly after 8 steps) and every of 8! permutations is possible -moreover each permutation with exactly the same probability. SST leaks bits of the key i.e., k g ½1 ¼ 111 but does not leak any information about the produced permutation. Fig. 9 . Example run of (time reversal of) Riffle Shuffle of n ¼ 8 cards and key k g ¼ ½00001111; 00110011; 01010101; . . .. At each step the left column represents current permutation, whereas the right one currently assigned bits. See description in the text.
1. It is known [3] that optimal SST for top to random initially marks card which is second from the bottom. time to generate a permutation was minimal (for a given SST) learns that one out of n! keys was used (out of n n possible keys). However there is a huge difference between these two shuffling schemes:
in Riffle Shuffle an adversary learns that in the first step one key out of n n=2 possible keys (leading to the shortest running time) was used. For the second step there are exactly n=2 n=4 2
for each choice of the key made in the fist step, and similarly for the next steps. This makes recovering any information about the key used infeasible. in Top-To-Random the situation of an adversary is quite different. It gets all lg n bits of the key used in the first step of the algorithm (provided the algorithm run for n steps). In the ith round it gets information about lg n À i þ 1 bits. Recall that these were the extreme and very unlikely cases. In both cases the probability of the shortest run is equal to n!=n n (¼ 7:29 Â 10 À55 for n ¼ 128).
Another advantage of Riffle Shuffle is that on average the number of required bits is equal to 2n lg n which is only 2 times more than the minimal number of bits (as presented in the example). For Top-To-Random on average the number of bits required is equal to n log n lgn which is log n times larger than the minimal number of bits. This follows from the fact that the variance of SST for Riffle Shuffle is much smaller than the variance for Top-To-Random. Smaller variance means that fewer information can be gained from the running time. While the expected number of bits required by KSA ÃÃ may seem to be high, for the post-quantum algorithms like McBits it is not an issue-McBits requires keys of size 2 16 À 2 20 bytes, Top-To-Random needs around 12,000 bits and Riffle Shuffle needs on average 4096 bits to generate a uniform permutation for n ¼ 256.
It is also worth mentioning that in real-life systems we could artificially additionally mask the duration of the algorithm: If we know values of ET for given SST we can run it always for at least ET steps (similarly, to avoid extremely long execution we can let at most ET þ c Á VarT steps provided VarT is known).
CONCLUSION
We presented the benefits of using Strong Stationary Times in cryptographic schemes (pseudo random permutation generators). These algorithms have a "health-check" builtin and guarantee the best possible properties (when it comes to the quality of randomness of the resulting permutation).
We showed how SST algorithms may be used to construct timing attack immune implementations out of timing attack susceptible ones. The SST-based masking leads to comparable (to constant-time implementation) slow-down (but it is platform independent), see Fig. 7 for efficiency comparison.
We showed that algorithms using SST achieve better security guarantees than any algorithm which runs predefined number of steps.
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